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Abstract 22	  
Early detection of emerging disease events is a priority focus area for cooperative 23	  
bioengagement programs. Communication and coordination among national disease surveillance 24	  
and response networks are essential for timely detection and control of a public health event. 25	  
Although systematic information sharing between the human and animal health sectors can help 26	  
stakeholders detect and respond to zoonotic diseases rapidly, resource constraints and other 27	  
barriers often prevent efficient cross-sector reporting.  The purpose of this research project was 28	  
to map the laboratory and surveillance networks currently in place for detecting and reporting 29	  
priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan in order to identify the nodes of communication, 30	  
coordination, and decision-making where health and veterinary sectors intersect, and to identify 31	  
priorities and gaps that limit information-sharing for action. We selected three zoonotic diseases 32	  
as case studies: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, rabies, and brucellosis. 33	  
Through meetings with government agencies and health officials, and desk research, we mapped 34	  
each system from the index case through response – including both surveillance and laboratory 35	  
networks, highlighting both areas of strength and those that would benefit from capacity-building 36	  
resources. Our major findings indicate informal communication exists across sectors; in the 37	  
event of emergence of one of the priority zoonoses studied there is effective coordination across 38	  
the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture.  However, routine formal coordination is 39	  
lacking.  Overall, there is a strong desire and commitment for multi-sectoral coordination in 40	  
detection and response to zoonoses across public health and veterinary sectors. Our analysis 41	  
indicates that the networks developed in response to HPAI can and should be leveraged to 42	  
develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveillance One Health network.  43	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Introduction 49	  
The emergence and spread of new pathogens is one of today’s highest global health security 50	  
risks with zoonotic diseases arguably the chief contributor.  Zoonoses occur at the interface of 51	  
human and animal health, impacting a wide range of health services and livelihoods. Social and 52	  
political issues surround their assessment and management.  Zoonotic viruses, parasites, 53	  
bacteria and fungi are recognized as threats to human health and sustainable development 54	  
worldwide, and are a major concern for national and international agencies (1). Significant risk 55	  
factors for the emergence and rapid spread of zoonotic diseases include: international travel; 56	  
global trade; increasing interactions among humans, wildlife, exotic, and companion animals; 57	  
human behavior; rapid microbial adaptation; changing climates and ecosystems; and changing 58	  
livestock management practices (2).   Domestic animals and wildlife are well-known reservoirs 59	  
of many emerging infectious diseases; roughly 75% of recent emerging infections and 60% of 60	  
all human pathogens are of zoonotic origin (3-6).   61	  
 62	  
Although zoonotic diseases clearly present a significant threat to human and animal public 63	  
health, many remain neglected due to competing priorities: for example, ministries of health are 64	  
coping with growing burdens of non-communicable chronic diseases alongside existing 65	  
maternal and child health needs, while ministries of agriculture/wildlife tend to prioritize 66	  
livestock management for food production and trade.  The costs of zoonoses in lives and 67	  
livelihoods can be enormous.  The effects of zoonoses on human health and economies have 68	  
recently been underscored by notable outbreaks such as the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus 69	  
pandemic, which began in swine farms on the Mexico-US border. Unfounded fears that meat 70	  
products could transmit “swine flu” led to major losses to the North American pork industry, 71	  
amounting to 25 million USD per week, and the banning of importation of pigs and pork 72	  
products by at least 15 countries (7).  In addition to natural disease threats, several zoonoses are 73	  
among agents that have the potential to cause severe health threats if accidentally or 74	  
deliberately released.   75	  
 76	  
Understanding zoonotic disease emergence, prevention, and control requires multi-disciplinary, 77	  
collaborative basic and applied research.  Communication and coordination among national 78	  
disease surveillance and response networks are vital in ensuring the timely response to a public 79	  
health event.  Through systematic infectious zoonotic disease data collection, we can gain a 80	  
better understanding of disease emergence and spread and provide mechanisms upon which to 81	  
build early warning and response systems for animal and human health.  Various frameworks 82	  
aim to support capacity building for disease surveillance and response, including the World 83	  
Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (IHR), the World Organisation for 84	  
Animal Health’s (OIE) Animal Terrestrial Code and Pathway to Veterinary Services (PVS), 85	  
and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) (8-11). Although systematic information-86	  
sharing between the human and animal health sectors can help decision makers detect and 87	  
respond to zoonotic diseases rapidly, resource constraints and other barriers often prevent 88	  
efficient cross-sector reporting.  Despite significant investments in technology, knowledge, and 89	  
the availability of the frameworks and programs noted above, many countries still face 90	  
significant gaps in their abilities to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to public health 91	  
threats, including zoonotic diseases.   92	  
 93	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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to zoonoses have 94	  
been tested and strengthened over recent years, spurred by a large brucellosis outbreak nearly a 95	  
decade ago and a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in 2006. The 96	  
Ministry of Health’s (MOH) Division of Zoonotic Diseases and the Ministry of Agriculture’s 97	  
(MOA) Veterinary Services have developed a strong and cooperative relationship across 98	  
surveillance and laboratory sectors.  While these relationships exist, they are informal and used 99	  
only in the context of response to major outbreaks or events.  By mapping zoonotic disease 100	  
detection, reporting, and response capacities across surveillance and laboratory systems, we 101	  
sought to determine where mechanisms exist to integrate single-disease networks into national 102	  
zoonotic response and to identify best practices/systems that can be applied across all priority 103	  
zoonoses.  Such mapping can help identify hotspots where zoonoses pose significant health 104	  
threats, but also where efforts can be focused to improve prevention, communication, and 105	  
coordination across veterinary and human health.  106	  
 107	  
Materials and Methods 108	  
The methodology consisted of systematically mapping the laboratory and surveillance networks 109	  
currently in place for detecting and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan.  Our analysis 110	  
does not include geographical mapping but rather an analysis reviewing major elements of 111	  
systematic capacity building as outlined by Potter and Brough (12). We identified, collated, and 112	  
then mapped the current surveillance and laboratory systems in place to detect, assess, report and 113	  
respond to zoonotic diseases using publically available reports and key informant interviews. 114	  
The relevant subject matter experts and other stakeholders for interviews and discussion were 115	  
selected by the MOH Directorate of Communicable Diseases and the MOA Chief Veterinary 116	  
Officer.  We selected three priority zoonotic diseases for our analysis with varying burdens on 117	  
human and veterinary health sectors to better define nodes of communication and coordination as 118	  
well as gaps for capacity building and systems strengthening.  This type of analysis may identify 119	  
current vertical, disease-specific strategies and frameworks that can be applied horizontally to 120	  
develop national zoonotic disease strategies.  It is important to note that our mapping does not 121	  
address the role of livestock keepers and/or the density and number of livestock, which play a 122	  
major role in disease outbreaks, transmission, and at times subsequent epidemics. 123	  
   124	  
Selection of priority zoonoses  125	  
There are multiple methods used in prioritizing disease detection and response capacity-building, 126	  
including analysis of the local and national burden of disease; global trends in emergence; 127	  
economic costs associated and cross-sector impacts; human morbidity and mortality; and 128	  
population health (3, 13-15).  Our goal was to examine coordination and communications from 129	  
the index case to notification at the national and international levels.  In order to determine the 130	  
mechanisms that promote and/or prevent information sharing across surveillance and laboratory 131	  
networks both within and among ministries, it was first important to determine the priority 132	  
zoonoses from both the public and veterinary health sectors.  Both MOH and MOA have 133	  
established priority notifiable disease lists, which are used to strengthen surveillance and 134	  
laboratory capacities; however, there had not yet been a collaborative discussion on cross-linking 135	  
these lists to develop formalized multi-sectoral priorities, particularly with respect to zoonotic 136	  
diseases.  We began with reviewing existing MOH and MOA notifiable disease lists and 137	  
selecting the zoonotic diseases on each list for consideration.  Through collaborative strategic 138	  
discussions, we identified five MOH-MOA priority zoonoses for further ranking.  We selected 139	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priority zoonotic diseases for case study analysis that aligned with three major categories of 140	  
focus for intervention at the animal-human interface: endemic zoonoses, epidemic-prone 141	  
zoonoses, and emerging zoonoses.  Endemic zoonoses account for the majority of human cases 142	  
and deaths, and the greatest reduction in livestock production.  Epidemic-prone zoonoses occur 143	  
sporadically or cyclically and the spatial distribution of outbreaks may vary, but epidemic-prone 144	  
diseases are often prioritized due to their impact on health and trade.  Emerging zoonoses 145	  
(diseases they are either new to a population or are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic 146	  
range) generally account for only a fraction of the zoonotic disease burden, but outbreaks may 147	  
have unpredicted and highly disruptive effects (16).  We assigned weight to pathogens associated 148	  
with a high human disease burden (morbidity and mortality); impact on livestock and wildlife 149	  
(production, economic loss); amenability to practice- or veterinary medicine-based interventions; 150	  
existing surveillance systems; and, finally, mechanisms for improved stakeholder 151	  
communication and coordination (17-20). 152	  
 153	  
Mapping of surveillance and laboratory networks 154	  
In collaboration with Jordan’s Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP), we developed case 155	  
studies based on past zoonotic events to examine coordination and communications from the 156	  
index case to notification at the national and international levels, in order to identify priorities 157	  
and gaps that limit information sharing for action. (Figure 1)  For the three selected priority 158	  
zoonoses, we developed case studies outlined in a five-step process: 1) Case Reporting; 2) 159	  
Reporting and Sample Submission; 3) Laboratory Testing; 4) Case Management; and 5) 160	  
Outbreak Investigation (Figure 2). For each case study, we created a decision tree at each of the 161	  
steps noted above, identified the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and recommended 162	  
steps for improvement. This resulted in a systems map that identified the nodes of 163	  
communication, coordination, and decision-making where the human and veterinary health 164	  
sectors intersect, highlighting areas of strength as well as gaps that would benefit from capacity-165	  
building resources.  This information can be translated into recommendations for strengthening 166	  
policies, protocols, and practices for preventing and responding to priority zoonoses across 167	  
veterinary and public health sectors. 168	  
 169	  
Results 170	  
Selecting priority zoonoses for analysis 171	  
In collaboration with the MOH-Directorate of Communicable Diseases (DCD) and the MOA 172	  
Veterinary Services, the combined Jordan FETP and The George Washington University Global 173	  
Health Security Program (GWU) research team determined that the most suitable priority 174	  
diseases for our analysis included highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, brucellosis, 175	  
and rabies.  These priority diseases represent endemic zoonoses (brucellosis), epidemic-prone 176	  
zoonoses (rabies, defined as a disease in which exposures to a single infected animal can lead to 177	  
multiple human cases) (16), and emerging zoonoses (HPAI H5N1). 178	  
 179	  
Mapping surveillance networks 180	  
MOH is the largest financer and provider of health services in Jordan.  Disease surveillance 181	  
efforts in Jordan fall under the oversight of the Director of Primary Health Care Administration, 182	  
which oversees eight directorates within MOH (21).  The DCD within the Primary Health Care 183	  
Administration is charged with disease surveillance and is most active in detection, surveillance, 184	  
assessment, response, and reporting activities. Within DCD, the Surveillance Department, 185	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Division of Applied Epidemiology, and Division of Infection Control (among others) oversee 186	  
specific programs and functions.  DCD’s Surveillance Department receives and manages 187	  
information from 22 surveillance sites throughout Jordan that track the 42 reportable diseases in 188	  
country.  Information flows from the health facility level to the health directorates, and then to 189	  
DCD, where data is compiled and analyzed to prepare the weekly reporting bulletin.  Within 190	  
MOA, the Secretary General Assistant for Livestock and the Chief Veterinary Officer have 191	  
responsibility for the organization and implementation of veterinary services, while the majority 192	  
of administrative control falls to 13 agricultural departments.  Veterinarians are trained in the 193	  
field on zoonoses communication and reporting, sample collection, and packaging.  Within the 194	  
Veterinary Services Department, there is an Animal Health Section, Poultry Health Section, and 195	  
Veterinary Quarantine Section, which coordinate with the governorate level departments on 196	  
disease surveillance and response.  Both MOH and MOA have notifiable disease lists for 197	  
immediate, weekly and monthly reporting. 198	  
 199	  
Mapping laboratory networks 200	  
Diagnostic and confirmatory laboratory services are provided from the Central Public Health 201	  
Laboratory (CPHL) to the health center level. CPHL oversees laboratory biosafety and 202	  
biosecurity programs for MOH laboratories and hospitals.  Each health directorate has a 203	  
laboratory coordinator at the governorate level.  Although Laboratory Quality Management 204	  
Systems (LQMS) and the logistical support to manage supplies and safe specimen transport exist 205	  
they are uneven at the subnational level.  Diagnostic and confirmatory testing capabilities are 206	  
shared across public and private sector laboratories, which can provide challenges in the event of 207	  
major outbreaks.  CPHL coordinates with the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU-3) 208	  
located in Cairo for confirmatory testing when necessary.  MOA has veterinary laboratories in 209	  
each of the 12 governorates that perform routine diagnostics at varying levels of capacity.  A 210	  
lack of resources, both human and financial, leads to a majority of diagnostic and confirmatory 211	  
testing falling to the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) (22). MOA coordinates with the UN 212	  
Food and Animal Organization (FAO) and OIE to assist with confirmatory testing, as well as 213	  
gold standard diagnostic tests when these are not locally available. 214	  
 215	  
Case study #1:  Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 216	  
As of 2006, Jordan and most of its neighbors have remained free of human HPAI H5N1 cases, 217	  
with the exception of Egypt (which reported 48 deaths and 165 cases between November 2014 218	  
and April 2015) (23-25). Jordan’s geography puts it at low risk for the introduction of HPAI 219	  
from migratory waterfowl due to its lack of surface water; key migratory bird habitats in the 220	  
Jordan Valley and around the Gulf of Aqaba are distant from major poultry production facilities.  221	  
A majority of Jordan’s poultry farms are commercial with backyard flocks comprising only 2% 222	  
of the sector (22).  The commercial sector is advanced for the region; including biosecurity into 223	  
its best practices (26). 224	  
 225	  
Existing networks 226	  
Following devastating outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in 2006, Jordan established the National 227	  
Committees on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, including the National Steering Committee, the 228	  
National Technical Committee, and the National Center for Security and Crisis Management 229	  
(previously the Disaster Management Committee) each playing a role in detection, reporting, and 230	  
response to highly pathogenic and pandemic influenza.  Jordan has both an Animal Health 231	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National Preparedness Plan and National Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza, which are 232	  
utilized by various ministries, including Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Planning, Foreign 233	  
Affairs, Transport and Communication, Interior, Industry and Trade, Education, 234	  
Communications and IT among others.  At the regional level, the Middle East Consortium on 235	  
Infectious Disease Surveillance (MECIDS) network developed an Avian and Pandemic Influenza 236	  
Sub-Regional Common Plan of Action for Palestine, Jordan, and Israel (27). The plan defines the 237	  
protection zone (3km radius from affected farm designated for culling), surveillance zone (10km 238	  
radius from affected farm where enhanced surveillance and control measures must be taken), and 239	  
case definitions for avian and human influenza cases (suspected, probable, and confirmed).  It 240	  
also outlines principles, procedures, and protocols for MOA and MOH officials in the case of 241	  
H5N1 in poultry (notification of suspected case, protection and surveillance zone established, lab 242	  
confirmation of H5, follow-up) and in the event of H5N1 in humans (notification of suspected 243	  
case, epidemiological investigation, lab diagnosis of H5 and follow-up).  In 2008, 32 244	  
representatives from multiple sectors (health, transportation, education, interior, laboratory, and 245	  
media) in Jordan, Palestine, and Israel participated in a regional pandemic influenza tabletop 246	  
exercise to develop action items based on various influenza case scenarios, including human-to-247	  
human transmission of HPAI H5N1.  This body is active in disease surveillance and response 248	  
across a number of priority diseases for the region and is able to activate and respond in the event 249	  
of HPAI if necessary.  The 2006 HPAI H5N1 outbreak in poultry is a good example of how and 250	  
when MOH and MOA communicate, particularly when there was an immediate need and 251	  
financial resources.  252	  
 253	  
Detection, notification, and response 254	  
If a patient presents at a health facility or hospital and the clinician suspects HPAI based on 255	  
clinical symptoms or due to reports of contact with sick poultry, the patient is isolated and 256	  
samples are sent to the Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) for diagnostic confirmation.  257	  
The isolated patient is treated with antivirals and health care staff involved in patient care 258	  
receives preventative treatment.  HPAI is an immediate reportable Group A disease; the primary 259	  
health care unit or hospital reports directly to the Health Directorate, which then reports to the 260	  
Directorate of Communicable Diseases (DCD). MOH also communicates with MOA that there is 261	  
a suspect human case of HPAI.  Likewise, if there are reports of poultry deaths and/or an animal 262	  
presents and is characterized as suspect HPAI, veterinary services will notify MOA, MOH, and 263	  
collect samples for confirmation testing at the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL). A positive 264	  
rapid diagnostic test for type A influenza may result in quarantine or culling of affected farms 265	  
while confirmation testing is performed at CVL.  MOA reports positive cases to OIE on a 266	  
monthly basis whereas MOH would immediately report a positive human case as outlined under 267	  
IHR (2005).  If the CVL confirms HPAI, Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) assist in providing 268	  
personal protective equipment (PPE) and restricting contact to affected farms/flocks to determine 269	  
proper culling procedures.  In addition, a poultry vaccination team will be deployed to 270	  
farms/flocks within a 7km radius.  In the event of a confirmed human case public health RRTs 271	  
will conduct in-depth reports and follow up with possible suspect cases and contacts.  If the 272	  
patient’s symptoms persist with unconfirmed diagnosis, treatment with Tamiflu continues for 7 273	  
days and care is provided per physician recommendations.  During an outbreak MOH and MOA 274	  
will communicate laboratory confirmed cases to each other on a daily basis.  Jordan has both an 275	  
Animal Health National Preparedness Plan and National Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza, 276	  
which are utilized by various ministries including MOA and MOH.  Figure 3 depicts a flow chart 277	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schematic of surveillance and laboratory channels.  Mechanisms for communication and 278	  
coordination among laboratory, public health, and veterinary officials at the governorate and 279	  
national level are strong in the event of a suspect case of HPAI H5N1.  Frameworks and plans 280	  
exist and function well; however, they are only activated in the case of emergencies. 281	  
 282	  
Case study #2:  Rabies 283	  
Rabies is a zoonotic viral disease that causes acute inflammation of the brain in animals.	  The 284	  
disease is spread to humans from another animal (e.g. dogs, camels, donkeys), commonly by a 285	  
bite or scratch, although exposure of mucous membranes to infected saliva is also a risk.  286	  
Globally, most cases are the result of a dog bite: exposure to rabid dogs is the cause of over 90% 287	  
of human exposures to rabies and of over 99% of human deaths worldwide. Rabies is a 288	  
completely preventable disease in the human population with effective veterinary vaccine 289	  
campaigns and effective reporting and rapid post-exposure treatment following animal bites.  290	  
More than 50,000 people die annually from rabies worldwide, despite the fact that the tools to 291	  
prevent and manage the disease are readily available. (28)  Once clinical signs of rabies appear, 292	  
the disease is nearly always fatal, and treatment is typically supportive.  293	  
 294	  
Existing networks 295	  
Human rabies cases are rather rare in Jordan.  Dog bites account for the vast majority of suspect 296	  
human rabies cases in Jordan (29). According to MOH, 4,753 patients were treated for rabies 297	  
exposure in 2013, but no human rabies cases were reported (or have been for the last 3 years).  298	  
MOA reported a total of 7 cases and 7 deaths to OIE in 2013 (30).   MOA provides free vaccines 299	  
to vaccinate animals for prevention and control of rabies; however, there is a limited vaccine 300	  
supply and an inability to cover the entire susceptible population. Currently, vaccine campaigns 301	  
focus on the companion animal population, covering stray dogs only as supplies allow. There is 302	  
no policy to vaccinate any potential wildlife reservoir.  Key to the control of rabies in Jordan is 303	  
the containment and vaccination of the stray dog population nationwide.  304	  
 305	  
Detection, notification, and response 306	  
Any human bitten by stray or wild dogs is considered a probable rabies case and the responsible 307	  
health official uses the case definition for determination.  All suspect patients are treated post-308	  
exposure with the rabies vaccination and MOH covers all costs for post-exposure prophylaxis 309	  
and supportive care.  Patient samples are collected and sent to the Department of Sera and 310	  
Vaccines for confirmation however testing of samples is not routine which can lead to 311	  
unnecessary costs of patient care from post-exposure prophylaxis for unconfirmed rabies cases.  312	  
Rabies is an immediately notifiable disease, MOH notifies MOA of suspect cases however 313	  
animal bites are reported to MOA on a weekly basis and to OIE annually.  The Surveillance Unit 314	  
within MOH conducts investigations into suspect cases and submit final reports to DCD.  315	  
Occasionally the RRT includes veterinarians and subject matter experts from MOA.  In the event 316	  
of suspect rabies case(s) in domesticated or wild animals, the local veterinary services is notified 317	  
and if based on case definition the animal is labeled suspect, MOA is immediately notified for 318	  
investigation. If the suspect case is in feral or otherwise non-domesticated individuals, the animal 319	  
is immediately culled without quarantine.  If the animal(s) are domesticated, they are quarantined 320	  
for 10 days under the observation of MOA; if the animal develops symptoms or succumbs to 321	  
infection, samples are sent to MOH-Department of Sera and Vaccines for diagnostic 322	  
confirmation.  There is currently no public veterinary laboratory in Jordan that has capacity to 323	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diagnose rabies in animals.  MOA will conduct an investigation of neighboring areas for 324	  
additional cases and quarantine when necessary. Figure 4 shows a flow chart schematic of 325	  
surveillance and laboratory channels.  Key to the control of rabies in Jordan is the containment 326	  
and vaccination of the stray dog population nationwide and timely confirmation of suspect 327	  
human cases in order to prevent unnecessary extensive health care costs for post-exposure 328	  
treatments on negative patients. 329	  
 330	  
Case study #3:  Brucellosis 331	  
Brucellosis is an important zoonotic disease of livestock, notifiable to OIE (31).  Globally, 332	  
human brucellosis is a re-emerging zoonotic disease with an estimated 2% case fatality rate, even 333	  
though successful eradication and control programs for domestic animals effectively and 334	  
significantly decrease disease incidence in humans, and have been established in many at-risk 335	  
countries. Symptoms of brucellosis in humans include fever with multiple non-specific clinical 336	  
signs and symptoms. Delayed diagnosis, chronic disease, failure of primary antibiotic treatment, 337	  
and relapses are common. Brucellosis is transmitted through exposure to infected animal 338	  
products (most commonly raw dairy products) or, less frequently, through direct contact with 339	  
infected camels, cattle, sheep or goats.  More than 500,000 human cases are reported worldwide 340	  
each year, (32) but the number of undetected cases is believed to be considerably higher.  341	  
Brucella spp. are also categorized as potential biological agents for deliberate use in many US 342	  
and international frameworks due to their high contagiousness and their impact on human and 343	  
animal health. 344	  
 345	  
Existing networks 346	  
In 1985, an official system for reporting human cases of brucellosis was established by MOH, 347	  
under the supervision of the Communicable Diseases Control Program Division. Spurred by a 348	  
large brucellosis outbreak in Jordan roughly 10 years ago, the MOH’s Division of Zoonotic 349	  
Diseases and veterinary public health actors at the MOA developed a cooperative relationship in 350	  
reporting and response to brucellosis. However, there is no national plan.  According to OIE 351	  
reporting, brucellosis continues to be in the top 3 zoonotic diseases reported in Jordan (30).  In	  352	   collaboration	  with	  CDC,	  the	  MOH	  and	  others	  conducted	  a	  burden	  of	  illness	  study	  in	  2003	  including	  353	   population,	  animal	  vaccinations,	  and	  laboratory	  surveys	  and	  validation	  study.  However, outbreaks 354	  
are still prevalent in Ma’an and Mafraq governorates on a seasonal basis and for various reasons, 355	  
including the lack of clear clinical symptoms and misdiagnosis, human brucellosis is 356	  
significantly under-reported and under-diagnosed, particularly by the private health sector (33, 357	  
34).  In Jordan, ruminants, particularly sheep and goats, are vaccinated at all ages, at any time 358	  
during the year, and annual revaccination is recommended. On average, about 18% to 25% of the 359	  
sheep and goats in Jordan were vaccinated through 2000, although	  unofficial	   estimations	  on	  360	   vaccine	  coverage	  is	  increasing	  and	  can	  be	  estimated	  at	  times	  to	  be	  as	  high	  as	  50%	  recently	  361	   published	  data	  indicates that only 1.5% of the small ruminant population is vaccinated leading 362	  
to regional endemicity, particularly in the north (35, 36).  Starting	   in	   2015	   a	   new	   project	   will	  363	   begin,	   a	   partnership	   between	   EMPHNET	   and	   CDC	   with	   Jordan	   MOH	   as	   lead	   implementer	   will	  364	   estimate	  disease	  burden	  in	  the	  human	  population	  (37). 365	  
 366	  
  367	  
Detection, notification, and response 368	  
When a patient presents with symptoms consistent with brucellosis and has ingested raw milk or 369	  
other potentially infected dairy products, the health official will use the case definition to 370	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determine whether to classify the case as suspect brucellosis.  Suspect human cases are reported 371	  
to MOH and the Occupational Health and the Food and Drug Agency of Jordan.  Patients may be 372	  
admitted to a fever hospital to confirm diagnosis and initiate treatment. Clinical samples are sent 373	  
to the governorate level laboratory for initial diagnostic testing, and to CPHL for confirmatory 374	  
testing as indicated.  The lab results are not shared with MOA.   When possible, health education 375	  
is provided to at-risk occupational groups (farmers, meat packers, dairies) working with animals 376	  
or animal products; however, there is no clear guidance for surveillance and outbreak response 377	  
for MOH.  In the event of a suspect case or farm(s), the local veterinary services will quarantine 378	  
the suspect farm(s) and collect samples for diagnostic testing at the CVL, at times and when 379	  
possible governorate level labs will perform diagnostics.  A team is sent to each suspect farm to 380	  
conduct an investigation, which includes an imposed quarantine, provision of herd vaccination 381	  
history, sample collection and testing.  A farm must test negative three consecutive times before 382	  
being cleared.  Any animals testing positive must be culled.  It should be noted that this	   is	   the	  383	   recommended	  procedure	  however	  we	  do	  not	  country-­‐wide	  data	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  implemented.  384	  
MOA reports all positive cases to OIE.  Individual animal cases of brucellosis are not reported to 385	  
MOH due to the endemicity of brucellosis in Jordan, however outbreaks are reported directly to 386	  
DCD.  Please see Figure 5 for a flow chart schematic of surveillance and laboratory channels.  387	  
As noted above, effective livestock vaccine campaigns can significantly reduce the burden of 388	  
human brucellosis.  There are clear seasonal patterns associated with human cases and outreach 389	  
and education on zoonotic transmission will be key in containing human outbreaks. 390	  
 391	  
Discussion 392	  
Mapping of zoonoses and the burden of such diseases can help identify vulnerabilities where 393	  
zoonoses pose significant health threats, but also where efforts can be focused to improve 394	  
prevention, communication, and coordination across veterinary and human health. These study 395	  
findings describe existing systems that can be strengthened or applied by stakeholders to address 396	  
current needs within Jordan, and offer case studies that can be applied in other contexts.  397	  
Although the findings may appear predictable to those already deeply familiar with Jordan’s 398	  
surveillance and response systems, the formal linkages within and across sectors may not be 399	  
immediately obvious to the increasingly diverse stakeholder and partner networks engaged in 400	  
long-term capacity-building for global health security.  401	  
 402	  
We found many similarities in surveillance and response capacities across local, governorate, 403	  
and national public and veterinary health networks regardless of the pathogen mapped, indicating 404	  
that improvement in response to one specific pathogen would most likely improve the ability to 405	  
respond to other zoonoses (Figure 6). The results of our mapping highlighted three main areas 406	  
for improvement towards building national One Health capacities: (1) a national zoonotic 407	  
reporting and communication framework, (2) a national zoonotic preparedness and response 408	  
plan, and (3) increased laboratory diagnostic capacity across governorate level laboratories.   409	  
 410	  
National zoonotic reporting and communication framework 411	  
There are strong informal mechanisms for communication and coordination within and across 412	  
local public health and veterinary services with consistent reporting up to governorate and 413	  
national levels. However, the local facilities are not always involved in outreach and 414	  
communication strategies for local response.  There is no standardized structure for 415	  
communication and information sharing across and within surveillance sectors and laboratories.  416	  
There is no formal mechanism or protocol for reporting laboratory confirmation beyond CPHL 417	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and CVL obligations to report back to their relevant ministry departments.  There is little, if any, 418	  
cross-talk between CPHL and CVL in both surveillance reports and laboratory confirmation.  419	  
This node of cross-sector communication is of particular importance when considering sentinel 420	  
and early warning systems for zoonotic disease outbreaks in the veterinary sector and in 421	  
investigations and response during simultaneous outbreaks of zoonoses in humans and animals.  422	  
We recommend establishing a framework for reporting and communication to and from ministry 423	  
department focal points to their local and governorate counterparts as well as across sectors at 424	  
each level of reporting. 425	  
 426	  
National zoonotic preparedness and response plans 427	  
Rapid response teams, both locally and nationally deployed, are effective in outbreak 428	  
investigation within their respective sectors; however, organization and deployment of multi-429	  
disciplinary RRTs are extremely pathogen-dependent.  This inconsistency can lead to duplication 430	  
of efforts during critical phases of outbreak response and containment.  While there are disease 431	  
specific plans, such as the Animal Health National Preparedness Plan and National Contingency 432	  
Plan for Avian Influenza, no national framework for preparedness and response to priority 433	  
zoonotic diseases exists.  We recommend that RRTs should be multi-disciplinary at the national 434	  
level, using the FETP as resource to link governorate level epidemiologists available for rapid 435	  
response. 436	  
 437	  
Laboratory capacity 438	  
Local and governorate level public health and veterinary laboratory capacity is inconsistent.  439	  
Some labs lack the ability to perform routine diagnostics, due either to constraints in 440	  
infrastructure, equipment, human resources and/or funding.  This inconsistency leads to delays in 441	  
time to pathogen confirmation and response as well as increased diagnostic burdens on the 442	  
national level laboratories, and at times, outsourcing to private laboratories for diagnostic 443	  
confirmation.  We propose that Jordan develop a national laboratory network, modeled after their 444	  
experience as a member of the Network for the Control of Public Health Threats in the 445	  
Mediterranean Regional and South East Europe (EpiSouth) Laboratory Network, to provide a 446	  
formalized, standard protocol for private and public laboratory partnership for diagnostic testing 447	  
or priority pathogens in the event of public and veterinary health events and those for routine 448	  
testing for sentinel surveillance efforts. 449	  
 450	  
Although this project focused on three priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan the challenges 451	  
identified from both public health and veterinary surveillance and laboratory sectors are 452	  
challenges faced by many middle income countries.  Our analysis indicates that the HPAI 453	  
networks in Jordan are well developed, coordinated, and effective in event identification, 454	  
diagnosis and response which suggests that these existing resources can and should be leveraged 455	  
to develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveillance One Health network.  456	  
 457	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Figure Legends 564	  
Figure 1. Model Joint Assessment and Response. In collaboration with the Jordan Ministry of 565	  
Health, Field Epidemiology Training Program, and Ministry of Agriculture, we examined 566	  
coordination and communications from the index case to notification at the national and 567	  
international levels in order to identify priorities and gaps that limit information sharing for 568	  
actions.  Efforts in surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue 569	  
while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green.   570	  
 571	  
Figure 2. Identifying Priority Zoonoses and Identification and Networks for Case 572	  
Management.  In order to select three priority zoonotic diseases for analysis, we considered 573	  
MOH and MOA notifiable disease lists as well as global priority zoonoses.  For the three 574	  
selected priority zoonoses, we developed case studies outlined in a five-step process: 1) Case 575	  
Reporting; 2) Reporting and Sample Submission; 3) Laboratory Testing; 4) Case Management; 576	  
and 5) Outbreak Investigation. The resulting analysis is a systems map that identified the nodes 577	  
of communication, coordination, and decision-making where the health and veterinary sectors 578	  
intersect, highlighting both areas of strength and gaps that would benefit from capacity-building 579	  
resources.   580	  
 581	  
Figure 3. Surveillance and Laboratory Mapping of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 582	  
(HPAI) H5N1.  Surveillance and laboratory networks for HPAI H5N1 including nodes of 583	  
communication and response were mapped across human health and veterinary sectors.  Systems 584	  
were analyzed beginning from report of a suspect case to diagnostic confirmation including 585	  
evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample submission; laboratory testing; case 586	  
management; and outbreak investigation.   Efforts in surveillance and response lead by Ministry 587	  
of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green.  588	  
Positive cases are noted in orange while unknown/unconfirmed cases are represented in purple.  589	  
Abbreviations: Ministry of Health (MOH), Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), 590	  
Directorate of Communicable Diseases (DCD), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Central 591	  
Veterinary Laboratory (CVL). 592	  
 593	  
Figure 4. Surveillance and Laboratory Mapping of Rabies. Surveillance and laboratory 594	  
networks for rabies including nodes of communication and response were mapped across human 595	  
health and veterinary sectors.  Systems were analyzed beginning from report of a suspect case to 596	  
diagnostic confirmation including evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample submission; 597	  
laboratory testing; case management; and outbreak investigation.   Efforts in surveillance and 598	  
response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of 599	  
Agriculture are in green.  Positive cases are noted in orange while unknown/unconfirmed cases 600	  
are represented in purple.  Abbreviations: Ministry of Health (MOH), Central Public Health 601	  
Laboratory (CPHL), Directorate of Communicable Diseases (DCD), Ministry of Agriculture 602	  
(MOA), Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL). 603	  
 604	  
Figure 5. Surveillance and Laboratory Mapping of Brucellosis. Surveillance and laboratory 605	  
networks for brucellosis including nodes of communication and response were mapped across 606	  
human health and veterinary sectors.  Systems were analyzed beginning from report of a suspect 607	  
case to diagnostic confirmation including evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample 608	  
submission; laboratory testing; case management; and outbreak investigation.   Efforts in 609	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surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by 610	  
Ministry of Agriculture are in green.  Positive cases are noted in orange while 611	  
unknown/unconfirmed cases are represented in purple.  Abbreviations: Ministry of Health 612	  
(MOH), Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), Directorate of Communicable Diseases 613	  
(DCD), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL). 614	  
 615	  
Figure 6. Mapping Public Health and Veterinary Surveillance and Laboratory Networks.  616	  
An overall analysis of existing surveillance and laboratory networks for zoonotic diseases 617	  
including nodes of communication and response were mapped across human health and 618	  
veterinary sectors to indicate areas of strength and those requiring strengthening.  Efforts in 619	  
surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by 620	  
Ministry of Agriculture are in green.  Strengths within and across sectors are represented by solid 621	  
blue and green lines.  Major gaps are represented in red while minor gaps are represented in 622	  
orange.  Abbreviations: Ministry of Health (MOH), Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), 623	  
Directorate of Communicable Diseases (DCD), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), World Health 624	  
Organization (WHO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Rapid Response Teams 625	  
(RRTs). 626	  
 627	  
 628	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